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Abstract
This study estimates the effects of terrorism incidents on a nation’s borrowing costs. An event
study approach is used to evaluate changes in sovereign-bond yield spreads after terrorist attacks
occur. Prior research is not in consensus on whether the effect of terrorism on bond markets is
significant, and no study shows why certain bond indices may rise while others may fall after a
terrorist attack. This study does not find statistical significance, which suggests that the effect of
an attack may depend on the targeted country. For terrorist researchers, this study is one step
toward answering whether terrorists can manipulate financial markets to their advantage.
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1. Introduction
An act of terrorism as defined by the Global Terrorism Database Codebook is an act that is
intentional, violent (or threatens violence) and perpetrated by a sub-national actor. In addition, it
must meet two more of the following three criteria: (a) It must be aimed at achieving a political,
economic or social goal; (b) It must be intended to coerce, intimidate or convey a message to a
larger audience; (c) It must be outside of humanitarian law (particularly against the prohibition of
targeting civilians)1. Due to the sub-national nature of the terrorist groups considered, they will
almost always face a better equipped and well-funded adversary against whom a “war of attrition”
strategy will be employed. Hoffman (2011) and others argue that terrorists are very effective at
achieving their stated objectives. The ability of small terrorist groups to wield outsized influence
is not a phenomenon that we can observe with other types of political violence such as traditional
wars. With hundreds of active terrorist groups functioning across the world, it becomes
necessary to study the impact of terrorism on the financial markets in order to make well
informed financial decisions. For example, investors may need to diversify their portfolio in
cases when terrorist activity has a significant impact on a large number of their investment
positions and may also need to find ways to hedge against this risk.

This study sets out to evaluate the argument that terrorism has a significant effect on sovereign
bond yields2. It begins by outlining existing literature on the determinants of sovereign bond
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National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011).
Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
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This is the first study to consider yield spreads instead of the movement in composite bond indices.
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yields and sovereign bond yield spreads and comments on the importance of the flight to safety
effect. It then transitions to a complete review of the slim body of literature that specifically
looks at how terrorism affects bond yields. This is followed by an explanation of the new
approach proposed, an outline of the data, the empirical analysis, results and the conclusion.

2. Yield Spreads and Default Risk
Merton (1974) explains that the three items upon which the value of a sovereign bond would
depend are: (a) the required rate of return on riskless bonds, (b) the terms of the indenture and (c)
the risk of default. Since the yields of a bond measure the bond’s return it follows that factors
which can bring about changes in the risk of default will also change a bond’s yields, with higher
yields signaling the increased risk premium that investors demand on the bond. It is generally
accepted that the risk of default is influenced by two sets of variables: economic and political.

For our purposes, it is useful to look at literature on bond rating agencies because they include
both when assigning ratings. Bond rating agencies assign ratings to countries based on the risk
that a country will default on their debt obligations. Although they publicize the variables that
they include in their calculations and mention political variables as a factor, the specific weights
of their inputs are not publicly available. However, several researchers have been able to create
their own models with results that have a high correlation with the ratings that agencies assign to
countries’ sovereign debt. While some of the earlier successful attempts to model sovereign bond
ratings such as Ederington and Yawitz (1987), Moon and Stotsky (1993) and Cantor and Packer
(1996) claimed that political variables are unquantifiable, later models were able to achieve
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greater predictive power by building on political science literature.

Hammer, Kogan and Lejeune (2004) used nine economic and three political variables (political
stability, government effectiveness and corruption level) to construct a model that is highly
correlated with the S&P 500 bond ratings with an R-squared of 91.2% (89.3% adjusted). Of
these variables, only political stability was significant at the 5% level. They also found that that
if the political variables are removed from the model than the R-squared drops to 88.6% (86.9%
adjusted) the correlation between the model and the actual ratings also drops and the confidence
intervals are increased. They conclude that although political variables are not critical to their
model they do enhance it. Hammer, Kogan and Lejeune (2008) build on this study and conclude
that political stability is in fact a “necessary” variable for the model. Other studies that
recognized that the political environment is very important, but did not specifically look at
political stability were Brewer and Rivoli (1990) Citron and Neckelburg (1987) Mauro (1993)
and Afonso (2003).

What most studies agree on is that political data is more difficult to obtain than economic. A
common source for this data after 1999 were three papers by Kaufmann, Kraay and
Zoido-Lobaton (1999a,b and 2002). For our purposes, it is interesting to note that while the 1999
papers make no mention of terrorism the 2002 paper has several mentions of the term and
includes it as part of an important variable in the study. More importantly, the studies are all
based on surveys of population and polls of experts and are entirely “perception-based”. The
ability of our data to overcome this weakness should not be understated.
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Given these studies, one mechanism by which terrorism can impact a country’s sovereign yield
spread becomes apparent. If terrorism impacts the stability of a government that, in turn, is a
“necessary” factor when one measures the risk of a nation’s default then, as demonstrated by
Merton (1974), the risk of a nation’s default will change the sovereign yield spread.

3. Flight to Quality/Safety
The clear picture illustrated up to this point is complicated by the “flight to safety” also known as
“the flight to quality” phenomenon. Vayanos (2004) describes flight to safety phenomena as
“sharp increases in market risk aversion during periods of turmoil.” During such episodes
investors begin to demand a higher risk premia for the volatility of an asset. Such a phenomenon
could impact our data in two ways. First, investors fleeing from a country’s sovereign bonds and
purchasing U.S. treasury bonds would widen the observed yield spread beyond what they would
be otherwise by decreasing the risk free yields of treasury bonds. Second, investors fleeing
volatility in the stock market within a particular country may reinvest their money into the less
volatile bond market of that same country. This latter case is most troublesome to our study as it
would have the effect exactly opposite to the impact on the yield spread that the default risk
would have. As explained in the next subsection, this study’s use of 10 year sovereign bonds
seeks to minimize it.
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4. Terrorism and Bond Yields
Few researchers have explored the effects of terrorism on global capital markets and even fewer
have specifically looked at its effect on bond markets. Schneider and Troeger (2006), Karolyi
and Martell (2006) and Drakos (2009) all found a negative correlation between terrorism and
stock market returns. Chen and Siems (2004) were the first to study the effect of terrorism on
bonds. They looked at both domestic and foreign attacks, but did not distinguish between
terrorist and military attacks by including attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Iraq Kuwait War and
attacks during the First and Second World Wars. Their small sample size of 14 attacks thus
becomes even smaller when one wishes to study only terrorist attacks. Using an event study
methodology, they found increased resilience to attacks in the U.S. and negative returns on the
day of the attacks. Other than the September 11th attacks, just one attack results in returns that are
significant at the .10 level: the Air India bombing. The study’s attention to terrorism beyond the
9/11 attack coupled with a consideration of the bond market was essentially nonexistent.

Gulley and Sultan (2006) were the first to consider the bond market’s response to terrorism. In
addition, the U.S. stock market, foreign stock markets, and currency exchange markets were also
studied using a GARCH model. While this study confirms that the negative associations between
terrorism and stock/exchange markets are straightforward, they conclude that bond yield
response is “tricky” and dependent on the type of bond index that is chosen. They propose that
the flight to safety/quality effects may increase the yields of short-term bonds while the
uncertainty associated with longer term bonds will cause their yields to depreciate. However,
they find a significant effect on bond yields for only one country: Japan, where the negative
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coefficient “may signal a flight to quality effect.”

Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011) find that a non-parametric approach works better than
GARCH and event-study methodologies when studying the effect of terrorism on financial
markets. Though they incorrectly claim that their paper is “the first one that analyzes the impact
[of terrorism] on bond and commodity markets,” their study is more exhaustive than Gulley and
Sultan (2006). Using 77 terrorism events they find that terrorist attacks do have a significant
impact on bond indices that can be positive or negative. Interestingly, they find that the Global
Government Bond Index experienced the most positive movement. It is not altogether clear what
accounts for the different results between their study and Gulley and Sultan (2006) in the case
when both use the GARCH and GARCH-EVT methods.

This study uses a more comprehensive data set than either study and focuses exclusively on the
bond markets. By using a much larger sample size, significant differences in bond yield not
previously observed may be detected. The most significant departures from earlier
methodologies is the use of benchmark bond indices that track the sovereign debt within the
country where a terrorist attack occurs (targeted country) and the introduction of yield spreads as
opposed to just yields. All previous studies have relied on bond indices that incorporate many
countries. Thus, their findings would not be useful for investors and researchers who are
attempting to discriminate between terrorist risk on a country by country basis.
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5. Hypothesis
Two reasons have been proposed for why different bonds may behave differently after a terrorist
attack. Gulley and Sultan (2006) propose that long term maturity bonds are more likely to ignore
the flight to safety effect while Cheney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011) find that Government
bond indices indicate greater yields following terrorist attacks. Building on these studies, the
expected result for long term maturity sovereign bonds would be a positive abnormal yield
following a terrorist attack. This expectancy is grounded in the assumption that 10-year maturity
bonds will not be impacted as strongly by the flight to safety effect and that individual country
yields will behave similarly to broader government indices that Cheney, Reshetar and Karaman
have observed.

6. Data Parameters and Applied Screens
The approach used by every study that looks at this problem to date has been an event study
methodology. While Cheney, Reshetar and Karaman concluded that a non-parametric approach
is more robust it is also much more difficult to apply given that there is only one example of its
use to model terrorism’s effect on the bond market. The better tested event study methodology is
thus applied in our study.

Drawing data from the Datastream database, 12 countries are identified for which daily 10-year
sovereign bond yields are available for years 1997-2010. For each day of each of the thirteen
years, a yield spread is calculated for each country by subtracting the 10 year United States
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benchmark “risk free” yield corresponding to the same date. These dates are paired with dates of
terrorist attacks obtained from the Global Terrorism Database. Several screens are then applied.

First, because it is necessary to make sure that the observed effect of each attack is not the result
of another attack’s lingering effect, all attacks occurring in the same country within twenty days
of each other are eliminated from our calculations. Because terrorist attacks tend to occur
together, this parameter eliminates a very large number of incidents. Another screen makes sure
that there are no missing values on the day of an attack, thus attacks occurring on weekends and
other days for which yield spreads are not available are eliminated. Nevertheless, in order to
obtain the best possible results as much data as possible is retained and so 16,821 data points are
included in the calculation of the eventual averages.

7. Calculations

Based on Cheney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011) three sovereign yield spread values for each
attack are calculated. An average yield spread for the twenty days prior to each attack is
calculated first (CY20). Then the average yield spread for the five days after an attack is
calculated (CY5). Lastly, the yield spread on the day of the attack is identified (CY0).

We run a series of “paired two-sample t-tests for mean” that are two-tailed and assume a normal
distribution. The H0 hypothesis is that the means for each value are equal for all countries and for
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each individual country for which a sufficient number of data points are available. In other words,
CY20=CY5=CY0 will hold for a t-test that includes all attacks for all countries as well as for all
attacks within any given country.

8. Results
The following table summarizes our results. It is important to note that for the United States,
instead of yield spreads, the entire magnitude of the change in the 10 year maturity benchmark
yield is used. Using a yield spread would have been impossible for the United States since it
would involve subtracting the yield from itself and the results would all equal to zero. Also of
note, is that the yields are all calculated in basis points “bp” with one basis point equal to 1/100th
of a percent. A “-” sign indicates that the yield spread has declined while a “+” sign indicates an
increase in the yield spread.
Mean Change in Yield Spread Following Terrorist Attacks3

Change in Spreads on Day of Attack (CY0‐CY20)
Change in Spreads Five Days After Attack
(CY5‐CY20)

All
Countries4

Spain

France

Germany

Italy

United States

.2bp

1bp

.4bp

1bp

3bp*

‐2bp*

.2bp

‐.1bp

0bp

2bp

1bp

4bp**

9. Conclusion and Interpretation
Although the majority of the results are not statistically significant, in ten out of twelve t-tests
3

** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.

4

All countries excludes the United States because a yield spread for the U.S. is unavailable.
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that were run the sign is consistent with our hypothesis. Overall, the yield spreads rise after a
terrorist attack indicating an increase in default risk. In the United States, where the real yields
(as opposed to yield spread) were considered we find a negative change in yields on the day of
the terrorist attack. This is an interesting finding that is actually highly consistent with the
flight-to-safety effect. It would make sense that the flight-to-safety effect is strongest in the
United States where a very efficient and large stock market can send loosing investors fleeing
into the bond market very rapidly. Furthermore, the reputation of treasury bonds as the safest in
the world makes them the ideal investment after a terrorist attack. However, in the five days after
an attack this effect appears to abate and the yields rise. In fact, the magnitude of their
subsequent rise may be heightened by their decline on the day of the attack. Perhaps the most
intriguing finding is that the impact of terrorist attacks may depend on the country where an
attack takes place. For example, while Spain had many more incidents it was Italy that
experienced the strongest and most statistically significant change in yield spreads.

10. Further Research
This study lends itself to continued research. I plan to further this study by including lethality
parameters and other indicators of the magnitude of an attack to see if they correlate with greater
movements in the yield spread. Just as important, is a need to improve the methodology of this
study. First, a non-parametric regression could yield stronger results as demonstrated by Chesney,
Reshetar and Karaman (2011) and should be applied to this study. Second, an even trickier
problem is the need to eliminate the counteracting effects of the default risk increases and the
flight-to-safety phenomenon following an attack. The latter is something that this study was
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originally intended to accomplish (unsuccessfully) and later tried to minimize by looking at 10
year maturity bonds. Yet, it seems that this attempt has also failed as shown by the results for the
United States on the day of the attack. The limited amount of literature on the flight-to-safety
effect presents a powerful obstacle to its elimination from any empirical study of sovereign
bonds.
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